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Abstract: This paper will explore the ways in which art may be understood as an ongoing 
experiment that interacts with the plasticity of the body to prompt change and affect the 
body-environment relationship. The arts offer an approach to research that recognizes the 
importance of the affect in studies of perception and action, self-organization and selection. 
An affective approach to experimentation would connect cognitive activity to the material 
processes of the environment in a science of our own fiction. This connection becomes 
the basis of affective experiments, which aim to yield new insights by merging the creative 
researcher with self-affecting-experimenter. To this end, I will discuss the scientific objec-
tives of the ’rubber hand’ and the ‘mirror-box” experiments are contrasted with work by 
artists-turned-architects Arakawa and Gins and three of my creative projects to suggest 
how creative research might enact embodied change. Throughout the paper I will argue 
that cognitive processes such as attention, selection, decision and judgment are ripe for 
re-entry and experimentation through an embodied approach to acquiring knowledge that 
is particular to the arts.
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This paper will explore the ways in which creative practices prompt change and propose 
that focusing on the embodied impact generated by fictive sets of relationships will produce 
new understandings of materiality and material thinking. Further, I suggest that the new ma-
teriality1 to be included in our reconsiderations of technology, materiality and relationality, is 
cognition. Specifically, it is the significance of the plasticity of relationships within and across 
the body environment that may provide the basis for the development of particular practices 
and creative research projects. The inherent re-configurability of sensing, sensation and 
sense-making (embodied cognition) enables but does not limit the way value is assigned to 
constitute world, supplying a great potential for experimentation.
The role of experimentation in the arts and embodied cognition as a material and adap-
tive engagement is crucial to our evaluation of what constitutes knowledge and the role of the 
creative research across the arts and sciences. The following discussions attempt to answer 
the question as to whether embodied cognition is a particular case of material thinking or may 
change what we mean by material thinking. To facilitate these discussions, I have selected 
three creative projects in which reconfigurations of material and conceptual relationships are 
presented at different scales of action, allowing the affects of these experiments to be studied 
first-hand. The constantly changing parameters that link art and science and art and life are 
unified in the experience and capacities of the individual (body-environment, artist-scientist, 
researcher-practitioner, etc). As a result, affective experiments enacted through creative 
research aim to bring together perceptual acuity and intellectual acumen for the production  
of everyday life. 
Experimentation, within creative practices, is a mode of encounter that reacts to the 
desire for hard data in the life sciences with a healthy allergy. The symptoms of this embodied 
reflex (watery eyes and melancholy) can be quelled by the cross-pollination of transdiscipli-
narity and practice-led research with uncertainty, indeterminacy and emergence. Experimen-
tal art therefore, might be characterised as a site where one makes distinctions and, by re-
contextualizing the relations among those distinctions, initiates change. Change results from 
a correlation at the level of embodied cognition that flows from the body-environment through 
loops of perception and action. As one of the aims of embodied experimentation, change is 
the mobilization of conditions (information context or environment) undertaken in a rigorous 
and reiterative process that may be called the science of our own fiction. This seemingly 
paradoxical proposition highlights the speculative, anticipatory and interpretative (evaluative) 
measures that inflect selection and self-organisation (the biology of cognition) and will enable 
researchers to address the cognitive interactions between bottom-up perceptual processing 
and top-down conceptual processing, which weld the body to the environment.
The influential work of Maturana and Varela’s Autopoiesis and Cognition (1980) can be 
posited as the prompt for developing an affective approach to experimentation on the biology 
of cognition. Their discussion of abstract thinking and pure relations in terms introduces a role 
for affect to play in self-organisation. The first hint appears in the opening essay of the book 
where Maturana makes a curious observation: “There are organisms that include as a subset 
of their possible interactions, interactions with their own internal states (as states resulting 
from external and internal interactions) as if these states were independent entities” (1980, p. 
13). The “as If” evokes a fictive moment, a pretense, a propositional or speculative fiction that 
plays a crucial role in selection, decision and ultimately, embodied change. In other words, if 
I project my perceptions (attentions, emotions, motivations) onto the external world will affect 
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An Ongoing Experiment At 
The Scale Of Attention
me and prompt changes in a significantly different way compared to suggestions based on 
internalized thoughts and feelings. The possibility of interacting with an internal state “as if  
an independent entity” changes the event. It also indicates that reconfiguring the value of 
relationships (literally repositioning internal states as independent) is an integral aspect of  
the role of embodied cognition in the persistence and change of the body-environment.
Since Maturana emphasizes that there must be an anatomical basis for all conduct and 
behaviors (1980, p. 20), the slippage between internal states and independent entities begs 
the question—for what cognitive activity was the “as if” substituting? Since cognition  
entails a re-entrant mapping through time, then from what point of view, or from which posi-
tion in the body-environment relation is it possible to interact “as if” one thing were another? 
What is the mechanism of selection in this instance?
I have interpreted Maturana and Varela’s description of this strange “as if” moment in the 
autopoietic process as a particular mode of selection that produces fictive certainty2 when 
interacting with cognitive states that allows speculation to affect viability. Does this  
fictive movement constitute the loophole that generates creative evolution? Bergson notes 
that the intellect tends to instrumentalize matter. He says the intellect “cannot, without reversing  
its natural direction and twisting about on itself, think true continuity, real mobility, reciprocal 
penetration--in a word, that creative evolution which is life” (Bergson 1998:71). When we 
become more and more attuned to the difference that arises in the process of making distinctions 
and surveying their affects, a “science” ensues. In the context of creative practice focused 
upon embodied cognition, science means a rigorous, ongoing and thorough fine-tuning of 
measures and the affects of measure through the exacting capacity of perceptual learning.  
A focus on embodied cognition avoids the problems that Bergson ascribes to the intellect  
because it allow us to think two things at once, body-environment, and thereby opens the 
door to experimentation on the processes that creatively afford reciprocity and mobility.
The first example of an affective experiment (the attempt to demonstrate links  
between affects, perception and imagination) has been selected from my own creative 
research. This ongoing project sets up an experimental, recursive structure that allow the 
observation of thought at the scale of attention, perception and action and an opportunity  
to study the small shifts affecting selection, decision and judgment. 
For several years I have been conducting an affective experiment: 2thhts@1nce. In trying to 
have two thoughts at once, that is, attending to the process of having two thoughts simultane-
ously, the experiment has been devised to see the how I might track embodied thinking as an 
indicator of the elusive issue of distributed cognition. The purpose of the exercise was to find 
a process by which I could observe the links between ongoing, concurrent sets of activities: 
attention, selection, decision and judgment as well as the relationship between thinking, making 
(drawing), remembering and imagining. A key assumption in deciding upon this task and the 
tracking process is the notion that perception is action3 and that both rely upon thoroughly 
embodied cognition. The cognitive activities listed above each participate in the relation of 
movement to thought and the uncertain links4 between attention and perception or, at the 
other end of the spectrum, conceptualization and imagination. Tracking the constellation of 
cognitive activities and observing their coordinated modalities, allows a researcher / self-ex-
perimenter to become particularly aware of the relation of vision and visual thinking to touch.
Drawing proves a immediate way to pursue this task because it allow me to produce a 
palpable, feedback loop (able to be experienced) that one can analyze and evaluate dif- 
ferences and correlate and assess remembered perception with documented actions. What 
makes James notion that experiences are themselves experiencable useful for affective 
experimentation, is that it erases the divide between the objective world, the world of relations 
and their meaningful consequences, placing the body-environment at the heart of a constantly 
forming world. Creative research optimizes this recursive loop by providing surfaces on which 
experiences play out. This process is begun in actions that are located internally (thought that 
initiates drawing action) and cross into the environment (chalk lines on the blackboard) which 
then become observable in relation to myself. The thought-perception-drawing loop allows 
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sensory-motor feedback of movement to interact with non-objective thought spaces such 
as imagined or remembered sensations, objects and relations. These three benefits of the 
immediacy of the drawing process produce finely textured differences that loom large in the 
process of tracking the distribution of oneself as an ongoing experiment.
What underpins my decision to use drawing for this affective experiment is my ambidex-
trous and cross-dominant handedness (sidedness)? The difference being that I can perform 
some actions equally well with both hands while others tend to a dominant side (for example, 
I can draw with both hands but I eat left handed, write better right handed, kick left footed, 
throw right handed, bat a baseball either side, saw wood left handed, shave left handed and 
so on). Approaching the task of drawing a circle and a square required learning how to set up 
the task as well as how to perform the simultaneous thought-perception-actions. I was very 
conscious not to let this exercise fall into a training exercise for coordination that would result 
in a party trick rather, I tried to keep the exploration aimed the feeling of what was happening. 
In this way I hoped the process would yield new observations, distinctions and insights with 
each reiteration. Because I am already able to draw from objects using both hands simultane-
ously from observation, (for example, a self-portrait, a pair of scissors, a chair, the corner 
of a room) it became important to interrupt this hand-eye skill by focusing on shapes rather 
than observed forms. I decided after much trial and error regarding the best structure for the 
exercise to draw a circle and a square at the same time. 
Fig. 1. Jondi Keane Blackboard drawings for “2thhts@1nce”
 For the tasks in the experiment called “2thhts@1nce” the first trials involved writing with both 
hands at once—simultaneously left to right, right to left, starting in the middle writing outward 
symmetrically, starting from the outside writing the word on the left forwards and the word 
on the right backwards, etc. These trials delivered insight regarding coordination but I also 
became acutely aware of the differences that drawing objects from the symbolic domain pro-
duced in comparison with drawing object from observation. When drawing symbols or ideas 
of shape, I began to focus on the difference between the letter and the line and the drawing 
movement as a separate activity from the thing drawn. In other words I was representing an 
image not enacting a form. The next trial was to write with one hand and draw a form/shape 
with the other hand. This seemed to foreground a left-brain and right-brain attributes and 
produce interference which, rather than embracing the task of having two thoughts at once, 
set the activities into conflict and competition whereby one inhibited the other.
The conclusion from these trials was to use the premise of drawing two shapes as the  
best way to pursue the “2thhts@1nce” project. In this way I positioned the notion of a 
“thought” to include all the ways in which one might interact with a shape/form (a circle 
and a square). After additional trials concerning which shape-forms to draw, the circle and 
The Science of Our Own Fiction:  
Affective Experiments Enacted Through Creative Research 
Vol 08 
Paper 03
Page
04 / 15
Studies in Material Thinking, http://www.materialthinking.org 
Vol. 8 (May 2012), ISSN 1177-6234, AUT University 
Copyright © Studies in Material Thinking and the author.
Enactive Theories As  
The Basis Of Affective  
Experiments
the square proved to be the most challenging, because of their similar boundary areas but 
exactly opposite constituents (a continuous unbroken curve versus segmented straight lines). 
These traits are the ones that, when attempting to draw them, present the greatest effort to 
keep distinct and separate (squaring the circle and rounding the square).
The types of observations and insights derived from these meditative experiments include 
an immediate confrontation with underlying tendencies of cognitive processing such as the 
unifying “I” that delegates or collapses cognitive activity. The unifying “I” breaks down into two 
overlapping tendencies: the person who attends and the organism that subtends knowing, 
perceiving and acting. From the slow meditative actions of drawing, problems also emerge 
as a result of the habitual and ritualized ways in which the I “holds” a thought. The simplicity 
of interacting with two shapes allows the researcher to observe the tendency to fall back into 
automatic patterns of activity or dispositions. Repeating the task of 2thhts@1once yields a 
few insights, which I will frame in the first-person: I tend to sequence activities rather than 
actually multitask; I tend, whenever possible, to subsume or unite two actions into one. This 
is especially evident when drawing involves right and left hand symmetry or when the two 
hands unite through the body into a single two-handed movement in the same direction. 
When drawing shapes simultaneously, I not only shift attention between the physical activi-
ties by sequencing, uniting or coordinating actions, but I also shift between remembering, 
imagining, producing and reproducing the shapes. Tensions arise between the persistence of 
muscle memory and the unique occasion of drawing “this” circle and square. These tensions 
are revealed through a sensation or texture of thought that nuance the tracking and reflective 
process with each iteration of the task. As a result, the space produced by each distinction 
opens new research possibilities for subsequent thinking/drawing attempts—the ongoing 
experiment is never the same. This constitutes an experiment in the micro-spaces of activity 
in which the possibility for change may emerge from interacting with one’s own our plasticity.
Affective experiments are living diagrams5 of the anatomical basis6 of change in relation to 
attention and selection in the processes of learning and unlearning. In this way the distribu-
tion of embodied cognition may become the practice by which to extract meaningful conse-
quences from our structured engagements with the world. The diagram is a way of thinking 
about the values used to track the movements across the body-environment, across scales 
of action or tempos of discourse. The important point here is the act of perceiving (under 
all its guises as attention, selection, distinction and designation) affects and is affected by 
interaction with the constantly forming world. The ability to experiment with values is what 
constitutes affective experiments that can mount a challenge to the history of the body and its 
relation to the environment. 
Enaction, as implied above, is the theory of cognition as a collective event that operates 
across the body-environment, each system embedded within the other, co-selecting the 
structural and organization features of the surroundings.7 What is crucial to the present 
discussions is how the enactive model of cognition describes a dynamic that depends upon 
qualitative measures and evaluations. Enactive theories suggest a way of extracting experi-
mentation from experimental structures in science because an organism uses precisely this 
mode of engagement to interact with the environment.
A form of measure used in the study of perception and action in ecological psychology 
determines how potentials in the environment [affordances] match with possibilities for action 
[effectivities] (Shaw & Mace 2003, p. 202). While ecological psychology foregrounds the 
importance of the body-environment relations it does not utilize the phenomenological dimen-
sion of cognition. However, the slippage from directly perceiving potential in the environment 
to extrapolating potentials is something that creative research and affective experimentation 
can readily develop. And for the creative practitioner, environmental potentials begs the ques-
tion: By what means or through which techniques can other potentials be selected? In other 
words how does plasticity acquire a trajectory? 
The way to an answer is through the mobility afforded by the fictive “as if.” When made 
operational, self-affecting activities actively shift and change what “counts as a match of 
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Examples From Art 
And Science
affordances and effectivities, thereby producing new qualities and intensity to be discerned 
and acted upon. If we recognize the fictive (that is to say virtual) of selection, the door opens 
to a host of experiments that purposefully mis-align or mis-match a potential to a possibilities. 
This idea of purposeful mismatching is supported in research on enaction, and the notion of 
precariousness where it can be observed that “only a sense making organism is capable of 
making mistakes by virtue of the mediacy of urge and satisfaction” (Di Paolo, E.A., Rhode M., 
and De Jaegher, H. 2010, p 51).8 Experiments in mismatching therefore open onto continuity 
and lead to a range of unanticipated events.9 Affective experiments focus on the link between 
perception and imagination in action rather than perception understood as sensory systems. 
Creative practices supply the context to pursue extreme play generated by affective experi-
mentation for the purposes of heuristic benefit and increased capacity.
Precariousness (Di Paolo 2010), tentativeness (Gins and Arakawa 2002) and fictive 
certainty (Duncan 1985) are different ways of acknowledging the role of affect and experi-
mentation in the dynamics of change (embodied change and change that enacts the body-
environment). This purposeful interaction with selection gives experimentation its affective 
register, breaking its servitude to repeatability, verifiability and invariance—research values 
held in high regard in the sciences. In contrast, Duchamp’s readymade is an early instance 
of inserting precariousness into a system upsetting the system’s relationality and materiality 
to derive an affective force. The readymade distributes a series of affect opposite to that of 
an object like the soccer ball, which for example re-organises the living room according to the 
rules and spatial relationships of the game.10
The urinal is not like the soccer ball. It does not merely redistribute a set of relationships, 
produces a set of relations that have no prior rule of relationality, changing the landscape of 
possible relations between objects, subjects and contexts. The readymade is a loophole in 
the contract between body-object and environment. Paradoxically, the urinal does not change 
the gallery it is the gallery that makes the significant gesture, standing on its head just as the 
urinal-fountain does.11 The gallery and urinal are made to match or align, leaving viewers 
upright in an upside down world. Duchamp’s complex gesture recasts an object as a ready-
made. This means the object’s use-value has been expanded to such an extent that it enters 
into an adjacent set of unanticipated and unprecedented object-subject, object-environment 
relationships. The readymade in turn activates the gallery making it operational, recasting 
the conditions by which one determines how potentials in the environment match with pos-
sibilities for action. Duchamp’s ploy uses the affective register of contexts to interfere with the 
structural effects of the environment and the result is destabilization followed by an expanded 
perceptual capacity.
When considered from the point of view of enactive theories of cognition and studies of 
perception and action, the gambit of the readymade exposes the mangle of practices12 that 
exist across experimental science and affective experimentation. The combination of ap-
proaches consistent across experimentation in the arts and sciences13 allow both methods of 
inquiry to be re-evaluated in order to renew our understanding of cognitive processes such as 
attention, selection, decision and judgment. This is what affective experimentation promises: 
the embodied acquisition of knowledge through a transdisciplinary inquiry. 14 
Before returning to example from my own practice, it would be beneficial to examine a few 
projects from art and science that expand notions of perception, object and environment 
through affective means.
The first project is from the art and two artists-turned-architects, Arakawa and Gins, 
whose work fits an experimental ethos and a transdicsiplinary mandate. Over their forty-year 
collaboration, they have actively engaged research across a range of inquiries, refusing to 
separate the body from the environment, language from perception, and thinking from feel-
ing. Protégés and friends of Duchamp, they began their collaboration on a project called The 
Mechanism of Meaning (1963-1973). The work consists of eighty-two panel puzzles broken 
into sixteen sections that explore a different embodied focus, for example, ”Neutralization of 
Subjectivity,” “Localisations and Transference” and the “Meaning of Scale.” Their research 
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took many forms including writings, architectural models, installations, residencies, communi-
ties and small cities, which has lead to the conception of a reconfigurable organism-person-
surround they call the architectural body (2002).
The panels that constitute The Mechanism of Meaning are life-sized material questions 
poised at the juncture of language, action, perception and imagination. Arakawa and Gins’ 
inquiry led them to consider how the body-environment could be made tactical and used as 
a hypothesis about architecture, in which a built environment “presents itself as intentionally 
provisional, replacing definite form with tentative form, the notion of a lasting structure with 
that of an adaptive one” (2002, p. 29). Through this adaptive and tentative approach Arakawa 
and Gins found it crucial to distinguish between “functional” and “procedural” which is useful 
when thinking about the value of experimentation in this context. Arakawa and Gins propose:
An architectural surround that is functional, such as a space capsule, … facilitates an 
organism that persons in its actions, extending the senses no questions asked, whereas 
an architectural surround that is procedural, a tactically posed surround, fills an organism 
that persons with questions by enabling it to move within and between its own modes of 
sensing. (Gins and Arakawa 2002, p. 58) [Emphasis added]
Fig. 2. Panel #2 from Section 11 “Mapping of Meaning” 
in The Mechanism of Meaning by Arakawa and Gins  
The key to Arakawa and Gins inclusive 
research project is the expressed purpose 
of asking questions through material means, 
in particular, by activating the environment 
or surroundings in every sense to generate 
new understanding of life by including all that 
happens as cognition within the purview of 
daily research. In contrast to Arakawa and 
Gins’ approach, which is affectively charged, 
contemporary experiments in the sciences 
also explore plasticity in ways informed by 
notions of extended mind, prosthetic percep-
tion and sensory substitution in the rubber 
hand experiment, the mirror-box device and 
sensing apparatus. These projects will be 
briefly described and the salient points  
summarized. 
Many contemporary researchers have 
conducted the rubber hand experiment.15 A 
research subject sits at a table with a partition. He or she places one arm on the other side 
of the partition unable to see that arm. Where the subject’s arm would normally rest on the 
table inside the partition, a rubber arm is placed to suggest continuity with the subject’s body. 
The subject’s hidden hand is stroked with a brush at the same time as the visible rubber 
hand. The subject sees the researcher stroking the rubber hand and feels the stoking of the 
hidden hand. The subject attributes the feeling to be coming from the rubber hand. The ways 
in which a person “locates” his or her hand is altered through spatial substitution and the 
sensory connections between vision and touch. The rubber hand seems to join with the body 
of the subject or, the subject extends his or her notion of body image to include the rubber 
hand. The experiment demonstrates how we are able to incorporate an external object into 
our body image (or map that the body has of itself) by substituting the rubber hand into the 
perceptual system through the body schema (or that which is perceived but of which I am not 
conscious). I have been the subject of this experiment and can attest to the strength of the 
substitution and the ability to locate the sensation outside the sensory realm of the body.
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Fig. 3. Rubber hand experiment
The Mirror box was devised by Dr. Ramachandran to assist with the chronic pain of phantom 
limb sufferers. The mirror box works by placing one arm into each of the holes provided 
at the front of the box. A mirror divides the box into two sides with holes for each arm. The 
dividing mirror hides the arm that suffers from phantom limb pain, due to amputation or nerve 
damage. The person moves his or her head to view the mirror image of the non-affected arm 
situated spatially in the location occupied by the phantom limb via the mirror. The visual feed-
back produced by seeing the pain free arm in place of the phantom limb allows the person to 
release nerve and muscular tension to free the phantom limb of pain. , Used for rehabilitation, 
the mirror box taps into the multimodality that exists in the connection between perception 
and proprioception.16 Both the rubber hand and the mirror box inhibit or constrain the habitual 
functioning of one sense in order to allow reconnections to realign or reconfigure through 
other sensory modalities.
Fig. 4. Mirror box
Sensory substitution devices operate in a slightly different way. Perhaps most well known 
researcher in this area is Paul Bach-y-Rita, whose inventive devices for sensory substitution 
utilize the connections between the senses to rehabilitate the brain by, for example, activating 
existing sensory systems—such as the skin and the tongue—to substitute for lost vision, lost 
sense of balance or as the tactile feedback that assists blind people to navigate. A tongue 
feedback device (Fig. 5 & 6) helped Cheryl Schiltz, who lost her sense of balance after taking 
an antibiotic. The accelerometer in her hat transmits movement data to a device fitting on her 
tongue. The tongue tingles at specific places on the surface of the transmitter to correspond 
with position and physical orientation (uprightness). Schiltz learned from the feedback on her 
tongue (keeping the tingling centered) to regain her ability to stand and walk. 
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Examples From My  
Creative Research
Figs. 5 & 6. Paul Bach-y-Rita’s Sensory substitution device for lost balance
These inventive body-environment devices are the result of many years of experimental 
science and, in the case of Bach-y-Rita,17 share an exploration of materials not unlike the 
processes found in the arts. The scientific application for these innovative deployments of 
affect and plasticity tends towards uses in rehabilitation from illness and injury. However, as 
Arakawa and Gins’ distinction between function and procedure makes clear, these devices 
remain functional because they amplify sensing and offer connections that are found to 
exist within multimodality of sensing. In other words, sensory substitution devices teach a 
person what he or she did not know their body was capable of doing. The devices hold the 
promise that an engagement with plasticity offers new prospects for multimodal sensing and 
for expanded interaction with the environment. A transformational and experimental project 
would seek to produce new capacities the body-environment was yet to learn. Alongside the 
scientific uses of experimentation, I would offer counter examples from my own practice that 
make affective experimentation work for the benefit of the self-experimenter. 
To suggest how experimental structures may utilize experimental structures and affective 
fields, I will discuss additional projects from my creative practice that aim to make percep-
tion perceptible. A characteristic particular to these works is a deliberate focus on change in 
scales of action within an experiment (for example, from the small micro-activity of sensation 
to a large scale collective attention at public events). 
For READING ROOM: Experiments in posture, movement and comprehension, I invited 
Alan Prohm a theorist and practitioner of experimental poetics and Prof. Shaun Gallagher, a 
prominent philosopher of cognitive science who collaborated with the artist and gallery cura-
tor Theo Lotz to produce three installation works as part of the proceedings of the internation-
al conference “Arakawa and Gins- Philosophy and Architecture” (2008) held at University of 
Pennsylvania and the Slought Foundation gallery in Philadelphia. The exhibition investigated 
the role of embodiment plays in the development of various aspects of cognition (Gallagher 
2005 p.4). The exhibition consisted of a series of posture- and movement-specific reading 
situations, which were staged to help visitors sense for themselves how their activity as bod-
ies and persons reading relates to the enigmatic action of understanding the purposefully 
selected Arakawa and Gins’ texts. The space of the text and of thinking, so often dissociated 
from the space of the person doing these things, gets produced through bodily interaction 
with environment. By highlighting certain connections between readerly action and perceptual 
phenomena the texts of Arakawa and Gins where installed in the same spirit of body-wide 
exploration to which the entirety of their project testifies. In these experimental situations the 
reader was simultaneously the subject of the study and beneficiary of the findings. 
I produced three installations for the READING ROOM based upon reading postures: 
sitting, reclining and standing. To read the texts, specific control of movement and orientation 
were required. Participants had to read texts backwards, from the bottom-up, vertically, and 
doubled. The subjects’ movements were constrained by the positions of each installation 
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and the apparatus provided: a seat, a seesaw and gravel on the floor (see figure 7 below). 
Responses to the installations ranged from amusement to frustration to intensified states of 
concentration and playfulness, prompting one person on the seesaw to say, “I remember 
reading the text but I have no idea what it said.” This seemed to be the response for the 
reclining work, which required persons to control the seesaw bed at an incline that allowed 
the text behind to be read in the mirror. The standing work constrained movement to a lesser 
degree but required readers to bend sideways, move closer and further away on the gravel 
and read texts that spiraled and ran vertically. This combination of exaggerated positions and 
unconstrained movement produced the strongest recognition of the embodied content of the 
text, connecting more easily with the physical demands made of the reader. 
Fig. 7. Jondi Keane—drawings for three READING ROOM installations
 The second work is a collaborative installation, Tuning Fork, which is part of a series of 
site-specific interventions with dancer James Cunningham. There have been three iterations 
to date: in a studio, a vacated shop front space and a converted drill hall turned choreograph-
ic lab. Each investigation activates existing person-object-environment relationships in an 
attempt to draw out, measure and track the events and established relationship of the world 
we know. The aim is to continue to push the familiar and, by rehearsing the habitual, allow 
the “adjacent possible” to emerge—the set of possibilities that may come to pass if slightly 
different conditions were present and if slightly different feedback loops were enacted (Kauff-
man 2000, p. 22). By simply changing the emphasis of the ways things become connected, 
we tried to reverse the figure-ground relationship to allow audiences to perceive the site itself 
through the material s and material processes. As the site becomes visible, the perceived 
events take on new meaning. As performers we deliberately tried to pull back to become part 
of the site, becoming attendants, operators, mechanics or acupuncturists of the architectural 
and social space.
Fig. 8. Jondi Keane and James Cunningham in Tuning Fork: Shopfront
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Conclusion To address the complexity of the affective field requires a reconsideration of the way experi-
mentation operates. Research that isolates phenomena in experiments produces excellent 
results and applications that populate our world—from new drugs to new distribution systems. 
Research that includes the turbulence of ongoing events and multiple levels of meaning may 
also provide a different set of useful findings—tendencies, trajectories, potentials and trans-
formative opportunities. Creative research focuses on the nuance across the relationships 
and deploys affective experiments to reveal and compare changes across iterations. The 
readymade is a good example of a simple action that perturbs systems of effects and fields of 
affect to expose their logic and extend their resonance. 
Arakawa and Gins’ work extends the resonance initiated by the readymade from object-
contexts to body-environment by optimizing the perceptual awareness through tactically 
posed built surroundings. Rather than initiate change through a gesture or object, Arakawa 
and Gins reverse the source of the initiating factor by putting the environment in a position 
to prompt gestures and object relations. If the surroundings are used to ask questions, the 
notion of experimentation can be expanded to daily life as daily research. It is from this 
perspective—of continuity—that creative practices are concerned with tracking events within 
complexity and recognizing that materiality and material thinking must always consider the af-
fective field. These concerns account for the reiterative nature of creative practices because it 
is the shifting results that hold value if life is to be approached as continuity inseparable from 
art and science. Hence the science of our own fiction acknowledges the embedded aspect 
of experimental science that resonates in an affective field and takes on meaning through 
myriad experimental lives. 
If one takes the implications of enactive and embodied theories seriously, then creative 
practitioners would have much offer through attention to specificity of materials, meaningful 
contexts and quality of movement. When experimentation can be extracted from the impera-
tive to participate in repeatability, verifiability and the production of invariance, it can become 
a heuristic tool for the production of difference. To advocate affective experiments means to 
value interaction of material processes with the materiality of cognition. Further the materiality 
of cognition both loops in on itself as well as co-mingling with the environment in selective 
actions. This extending towards (or linking and coupling with) the environment means that 
must we consider the activities of cognition to be a material process that impact upon the 
body-environment relation constructing the shared world in both pragmatically (situated) and 
speculatively (virtual).
Creative research presupposes that fictive certainty (Duncan 1985) is an embodied tactic, 
which among other things, searches for opportunities to interact with one’s own cognitive pro-
cesses and optimize perceived potentials in the world. It is in the slippage between anatomy 
and selectivity that can be inflected as a matter of experimentation. The slippage begins in 
perception of and the ‘apportioning out’ of undifferentiated experience, which leaves much 
of our interaction with the world open to suggestion. It is at this point cognitive processes—
attention, selection, decision and judgment—are ripe for re-entry through an embodied 
approach to experimentation. Affective experiments emphasize the assertion that “relations 
between the knower and the known are also part of that immediate experience” (Heft 2001: 
36-37). Ultimately, an experimental ethos is useful only to the extent that it allows perception 
and action to develop a heuristic potential and becomes beneficial to the self-experimenter. 
Plasticity—the capacity a self-experimenter wants to promote—acquires a trajectory from the 
actions and selections built up across the body-environment. This circuit is also the basis of 
creative practices, which when activated to think materially, explores the processes by which 
observation and learning lead to transformation and change. 
The fictive power of selection repositions experimentation as a mode by which the body-
environment explores possibility and potential. The affective experiment, at its best, offers a 
way through the cultural cold war over who assigns value and loosens experimentation from 
its commitment to profound facts—of what bodies do—and turns towards the pro-finding of 
capacity—particularly in the constantly forming space between selection and self-organization.
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Endnotes 1  See Keane 2009 “ Embodied Cognition is a special kind of movement” and (forthcoming 2012) Æffect: towards  
heuristic life” in which I argue that cognition, embodied, situated and distributed cognition is both the material  
substrate for and the interaction with information and context that shapes the body-environment and the entities  
we name as separate identities such as person, objects, forces, conditions, surroundings.
2 See Robert Duncan (1985) for a discussion of fictive certainty and “as if” as a performative utterance that  
acknowledges the power of fictive action (both perception in action and the saying that makes it so) upon which  
poetry is founded.
3 Although the paraphrase is a reference to Alva Noe’s (2004) Action in Perception, the source of this approach  
stems from William James’ (1976) notion of radical empiricism emphasizing, among other things, that experi- 
ences are themselves experiencable. This assertion changes the way lived experience, the philosophy of per- 
ception and research on cognition have developed. For an excellent history of James influence on contemporary  
ecological psychology see Heft (2001). 
4 Studies such as Arien Mack and Irvin Rock (1998) have questioned the sequence and interdependence of atten- 
tion and perception. Which activity is required first—e.g. must I know what a cup is as a precept in order to have  
my attention land upon a cup or can my attention wash across something on a table which I then come to per- 
ceive as a cup? Subsequently this research has been pursued under the rubric known as change blindness. 
While studying perception under conditions of inattention, Mack and Rock coined the term Inattentional Blind- 
ness, or IB. Their assumption was that something had to be perceived without attention (1998, p. 55). The find- 
ings from their experiments show that “subjects may tacitly learn to inhibit attention from particular spatial loca- 
tions which then leads to a significant increase in IB” (1998, p.64). This implies that, when measuring for effect,  
you cannot separate out affect, especially attention to content and context. Mack and Rock conclude that atten- 
tion provides the key that unlocks the gate dividing unconscious perception from conscious perception and that  
without this attentional key there is simply no awareness of the stimulus (1998, p. 71). This has developed into  
research now conducted under the description of change blindness.
5 See Massumi (2002) and Manning (2009) for discussion of the biograms that inform current discussion of the 
diagram to which Massumi returns in “The Diagram as Technique of Existence: Ovum of the Universe Segmented” the 
third chapter in his latest book (2011, pp. 87-104). While the biogram is a “virtual node out of which a bodyness 
can be felt, this feltness is an affective experience. It is the tendency of a body to become that the biogram 
makes palpable” (Manning 2009, p 124) which is contrasted with yet closely related to the diagram. “From 
diagram to biogram is a passage through a different abstract machine, once connected to techniques of appear-
ance and disappearance of a becoming body (Manning 2009, p 124). Arakawa and Madeline Gins’ discussion 
of the living diagram or diagrammatic living offers a way of tracking perceptual learning and the multitudes of 
configurations that can be produced from the segments of awareness that constitute our bioscleave (that is, a 
constantly forming world) They suggest that their working terms function diagrammatically, supplying “instant 
referent delivery”, where by if “used diagrammatically, a term intermixes now lightly, now abundantly with  its 
referent, which occurring on demand, suffuses the would-be diagram with itself” (Gins and Arakawa 2006,  
pp. 101,102). The diagram becomes an activity with biotopological implications (2006, pp 54-73) tied to co- 
constructing the world as opposed to biogrammatically pertaining to the intensities of bodies.
6 As mentioned above, Maturana emphasizes that there must be an anatomical basis for all conduct and  
behaviors (1980, p. 20).
7 See Stewart J., Gapenne. O., Di Paolo, E.A. (2010) Enaction: toward a new paradigm for cognitive science,  
which surveys current thinking that stems from Varela, Thompson and Roach (1992) The Embodied Mind and  
Thompson’s (2010) Mind in Life, which develops subsequent work with Varela (until his death) into the theory  
of enaction.
8 See Di Paolo, Rhode and De Jaegher’s essay “Horizons for the Enactive Mind: Values social interaction and  
play” (2010) in which they posit a gradient of autonomy and mediacy, which “connects increasing degrees of  
mediation between an urge and it satisfaction to higher degrees of precariousness and to the consequent  
liberation of ways to generate value. 
9 Biologist Stuart Kauffman calls the ecological niches that may arise, the “adjacent possible” (2000, p. 22, pp.  
142-144). 
10 Brian Massumi correlates the way in which Michel Serres, Bruno Latour and Pierre Levy all use the soccer ball to 
discuss the relation of subject to object and an individual to the collective (2002: 71). In this instance objects that 
fit into a pre-figured system of objects, or actions that fit in to a prefigured system of objects can be imported  
into a space effectively reorganizing the body-environment and subsequent actions of selection. While unantici-
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Figure Notes
pated relationships arise, the conditions for perception and action and not extended or expanded. 
11 This is not so dissimilar to the way Marx illustrates of the commodity fetish by describing the wooden table  
standing on its head and sprouting grotesque ideas from its wooden brain (1992, p. 163). 
12 In what Andrew Pickering has called the ‘mangle of practice,’ he locates the performativity of practice within a  
conception of scientific culture (1995, p. 5). Through the physicist Giacomo Morpurgo experimental work, he  
notes that in order to produce facts, the physicist had to make resistances fit particular material-conceptual  
alignments. Pickering concludes that practice is a type of modelling which has “an important real-time structure  
with the contours of cultural extension being determined by the emergence of resistances and by the success or  
failure of accommodations to resistance,” (1995, p. xi). 
13 This approach aligns with Deleuze’s affective approach to experimentation in which “Affect [from Spinoza] is the  
sensation of what favours or prevents, augments or diminishes, the powers of life of which we are capable each  
with one another;” and Rajchman notes, “it is in something of this same “ethical” sense that Deleuze proposes  
to extract clinical categories (like “hysteria” or “perversion” or “schizophrenia”) from their legal and psychiatric  
contexts and make them a matter of experimentation in modes of life in art and philosophy, or as categories of a  
philosophical-aesthetic ‘clinic’” (Rajchman 2000, p. 132). 
14 Transdisciplinarity is characterized by an effort to deal with disciplinary fractures by deploying the logic of one  
theory/practice (approach) to work in the elaboration of another without reducing one to the other (see Nicolescu  
1997, 2008). 
15 See <http://forum.davidson.edu/psy379/2010/10/18/is-that-my-hand-because-it-certainly-feels-like-it/> for a dis-
cussion of the experiment done by Botvinick and Cohen and the replicated experiment conducted by Capelari,  
Uribe, and Brasil-Neto. I experienced this experiment first had at the University of Tokyo where the students of 
physicist Takashi Ikegami were conducting it in 2008.
16 Dr. Vilayanur Subramian Ramachandran studies the relationship of what one sees as influenced by the reporting  
or, by what one tells oneself. This supports the notion of a fictive or discretionary aspect to self-organization. See 
<http://www.residency-match.com/node/vilayanur-s-ramachandran> 
17 For an extended discussion of Cheryl Schiltz condition and Bach-y-Rita’s research, see the first essay in Norman 
Doidge’s book The Brain that Changes Itself (2007, pp 1-26).
Fig. 1. Jondi Keane—Blackboard drawing for “2thhts@1nce.” 
Fig. 2. Panel #2 from Section 11, “Mapping of Meaning” in The Mechanism of Meaning by Arakawa and Gins  
 (1997, p. 92). Permission: Madeline Gins. 
Fig. 3. Rubber hand experiment image. Retrieved from  
 http://forum.davidson.edu/psy379/2010/10/18/is-that-my-hand-because-it-certainly-feels-like-it/  
 (accessed August 15, 2011).
Fig. 4. Mirror box. Retrieved from http://www.residency-match.com/node/vilayanur-s-ramachandran  
 (accessed August 15, 2011).
Fig. 5 & 6. Bach-y-Rita’s Sensory substitution device lost balance.  
 http://discovermagazine.com/2003/jun/feattongue/article_view?b_start:int=2&-C= (accessed August 15, 2011)  
 and http://www.news.wisc.edu/5837 (accessed August 15, 2011).
Fig. 7. Jondi Keane—drawings for three READING ROOM installations. 
Fig. 8. Jondi Keane and James Cunningham in Tuning Fork: Shopfront (2009). Photo by Suzon Fuks.
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